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Oil, Development, and the Politics 
of the Bottom Billion1
Michael Watts
The secret of great wealth with no obvious source is some 
forgotten crime, forgotten because it was done neatly.
Honoré de Balzac
[R]egions at the epicenter of oil production are torn apart by 
repeated conflicts.
Achille Mbembe (2001)
The Economist of 4 August 2007 called it a “slip of a book” and “set 
to become a classic.” Paul Collier’s The Bottom Billion argues that most 
of the bottom billion, the world’s chronically poor, live in 58 countries 
(almost three quarters of which are African) distinguished by their 
lack of economic growth and the prevalence of civil conflict. Most 
are caught in a quartet of “traps,” two of which (in Collier’s account 
they are deeply related) concern me here: the civil war trap (the aver-
age cost of a typical civil war is about $64 billion) in which 73% of the 
poor have been caught at one time or another; and a natural-resource 
trap (resource wealth or dependency turned sour), which accounts 
for another 30%.2 Collier’s argument is not simply that civil conflict 
is expensive in human and developmental terms nor that wars are 
associated with economic stagnation and poverty (“low income means 
poverty, and low growth means hopelessness. Young men, who are 
recruits for rebel armies, come pretty cheap…Life itself is cheap”3). 
Rather, he sees this nexus of forces as arising from resource depen-
dency (“Dependence upon primary commodity exports…substantially 
increases the risk of civil war”4). That is to say, there is a robust rela-
tionship between resource wealth and, paradoxically, poor economic 
performance, poor governance (resource predation), and the likeli-
hood of falling into (debilitating and enduring) civil conflicts. Collier’s 
book speaks to a wider interest taken by economists and political sci-
entists in what seems like a challenge to economic orthodoxy, namely, 
that resource wealth (as a source of comparative advantage) turns out 
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to be a “curse.”5 The “resource-curse” literature—whether emphasiz-
ing poor economic performance, state failure (oil breeds corruption 
or “resource rents make democracy malfunction”6), or the onset of 
civil violence (blood diamonds, oil secession)—has generated a vast 
amount of research of which Collier and his colleagues have been cen-
tral contributors.
Perhaps not surprisingly, Nigeria figures centrally in Collier’s book. 
An oil state gone awfully wrong, a black hole for foreign aid ($280 bil-
lion in 30 years with “depressingly little to show for it”), endemic (per-
haps Olympian) corruption and rent seeking, mass miscomprehension 
or false consciousness (the popular Nigerian belief that the poverty 
of the 1980s was a function of structural adjustment rather than the 
massive mismanagement of the oil boom-bust cycle), and a litany of 
military governments interspersed with periods of civilian rule which 
confirm his claim that “resource-rich democracies” and an abundance 
of oil rents alters how electoral competition is conducted (“it lets in 
the politics of patronage”7). Big Oil engenders Big Patronage (“the law 
of the political jungle: the survival of the fattest”8). Oil wealth relaxes 
political constraints, most obviously by obviating the need to tax. The 
sort of democracy that resource-rich states engender is “dysfunctional 
for economic development,” especially if they are low income and eth-
nically diverse. To round out the story, the combustible mix of the law 
of the survival of the fattest under the dispensation of oil provides ideal 
grounds for resource predation and the illicit economy of rebellion (the 
economic basis of civil war). Nigeria and its oil-producing Niger Delta 
is a textbook case of why rebellions have much less to do with what 
rebel leaders say about their political project (liberation, justice, equity) 
and much more to do with organized crime and the readiness with 
which the resource upon which the fattest depend can be looted.
[I]f low income and slow growth make a country prone to civil war…
why[?]… . low income means poverty, and low growth means hope-
lessness. Young men, who are the recruits for rebel armies, come pretty 
cheap… . Life is cheap and joining a rebel movement gives these young men a 
small chance of riches… . [People in the Niger Delta] with a sense of griev-
ance were no more likely to take part in violent protest than those who 
were not aggrieved. So what did make people more likely to engage 
in political violence?…well, being young, being uneducated, and being 
without dependents… . [There] was no relationship between social ame-
nities that a district possessed and its propensity to political violence. 
Instead the violence occurs in the districts with oil wells… . [A]lthough 
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the risk of violence jumps sharply if there is at least one oil well, if there 
are two oil wells in the district it starts to go down. And with twenty oil 
wells it is lower still…To my mind this looks more like a protection racket than 
outrage provoked by environmental damage. In the absence of an oil well 
there is no scope for extortion and so no violent protest. With an oil well 
the protection racket is in business. But the more oil wells…the greater 
the incentive for an oil company to pay up and buy peace. …[O]ver time 
the situation has evolved. There is now a huge amount of money being 
directed by the Nigerian federal government to the delta region and the 
oil companies are desperately paying protection money…Within the 
region local politicians are fighting it out for control of all this money 
and violent protest has become an orchestrated part of the political 
rent seeking. Grievance has evolved, over the course of a decade, into greed.9 
(emphasis added)
Oil democracy, says Collier, is an oxymoron. In this rendering, oil 
accounts for a delusional body politic, psychopathic criminals dressed 
as freedom fighters, state institutions resembling those of Albanian 
socialism, and rafts of Big Man patrons armed with real estate in Nice 
and offshore accounts in the Cayman Islands. Furthermore, it ensures 
a descent into civil conflict that is likely to last seven years and make 
people 15% poorer. Albanian socialism, in fact, looks pretty good by 
comparison.
There is the ring of truth here. Oil wealth can be, and often is, ill 
managed. Oil-producing states are among the most corrupt and venal 
anywhere. The world of oil rents is one of spectacular consumption 
pushed to its limits. But the language of curse invokes a merciless force 
for adversity, a sort of commodity determinism vesting oil with capa-
bilities it can neither possess nor dispense. The danger is that the curse 
substitutes the commodity for the larger truths of capitalism, markets, 
and politics. Is Nigeria cursed by oil or corruption (or corporate capi-
talism); by petroleum or politics (or ethnicity)?
Macalester International  Vol. 24
82
I. Globalization, Resource Development, and Oil
Oil is fluid and fugitive.
A petro-geologist, cited in Variant 28 (2007)
Oil is a fungible global commodity
Oil Shockwave, Robert Gates et al. (2005)
Oil is arguably one of the most global and strategic commodities within 
the “capitalist cosmos,” as Max Weber called the modern world of com-
modity production. In fact, it is the very basis of development as we 
know it. Oil, in this regard, sheds light on two key concepts: globaliza-
tion and development. Much has been written about both phenomena. 
For the purposes of this essay, oil as an emblem of globalization refers 
simultaneously to the fact of a worldwide global market (for oil and 
gas), the organization of its commodity chain (from production to con-
sumption) characterized by “overcoming the friction of distance” (that 
is to say, complex forms of social relations stretched over time reflected 
in transnational interdependencies), and complex transnational flows 
of capital. The lineaments of global oil are clear. The global oil and gas 
infrastructure—the material basis of the oil and gas supply, otherwise 
known as the global value-chain—is nothing short of gargantuan. To 
say that the value of the industry now totals over $4,000 billion says 
everything and nothing. Close to one million producing oil wells punc-
ture the surface of the earth (77,000 were drilled in 2007, with 4,000 off-
shore; 3,300 are sub-sea). More than two million kilometers of pipeline 
blanket the globe in a massive trunk-network: 75,000 km move oil and 
gas along the sea floor. Another 156,000 km of pipeline is anticipated to 
be completed between 2008 and 2012. There are 6,000 fixed platforms 
and 635 offshore drilling rigs (the international rig total for March 2008 
is 3,259, according to Baker Hughes). In 2007, $68 billion was spent 
on offshore drilling. In addition, 4295 oil tankers (vessels greater than 
1,000 long tons or more deadweight) move 2.42 billion tons of oil and 
oil products per year, 34% of global seaborne trade. There are 717 refin-
eries that process crude oil. More than 80 massive floating, production, 
and storage vessels have been installed in the last five years.
Deepwater exploration is the very embodiment of the global urge, 
the ceaseless territorial imperative to locate new fields, with deep-
water offshore expected to grow by 78% between 2007 and 2011. On 
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2 August 2007, a Russian submarine with two parliamentarians on 
board planted a titanium flag two miles down under the North Pole. 
At stake were the lucrative new oil and gas fields (by some estimates 
10 billion tons of oil equivalent) on the Artic sea floor. Two weeks later, 
it was announced that the Northwest Passage was navigable, facilitat-
ing the opening of a new oil frontier, the ecological precondition of 
which—global warming—was the product of Big Oil. Environmental 
crisis (the second contradiction of capital) creates the conditions for 
another round of capitalist investment and a new and spectacular capi-
talist frontier—in short, recursive primitive accumulation. Sub-zero 
temperatures and almost year-round darkness presented no obstacles 
to the purveyors of oil. In late 2006, a consortium of companies discov-
ered oil at a staggering depth, 150 miles into the Gulf of Mexico. The 
test well, Jack-2, delves through 7,000 feet of water and 20,000 feet of 
sea floor to tap oil in tertiary rock laid down 60 million years ago. The 
drill ships and production platforms required for such an undertaking 
are massive floating structures, much larger than the biggest aircraft 
carriers, and more expensive, costing well over a half-billion dollars 
(and close to a million dollars a day) to rent. In 2007, the vast new Tupi 
field in Brazilian coastal waters was discovered in 200 meters of water 
below a massive layer of salt in hugely inhospitable geological condi-
tions. One test well cost over $250 million. In short, what is on offer is 
a deepwater land grab. Primitive accumulation and globalization at 
7,000 meters!
None of this is to suggest that globalization produces a frictionless 
world of homogenous space. Quite the contrary. Globalized oil and gas 
reveals precisely how global forces are always localized in place- or 
region-specific “oil complexes.”10
As a global commodity central to the development project of oil and 
non-oil producers alike, we must take seriously the Janus-faced prop-
erties of any commodity: it is a particular unity of use and exchange 
values, and at the same moment, an object of mystification and 
fetishization. As Fernando Coronil put it in The Magical State, “oil illus-
trates…the mystification of natural resources in the modern world.”11 
To this extent, we should be careful not to be seduced by the fetishism 
of oil or invest in it powers that it does not deserve. It is important to 
carefully specify the complex traffic between petroleum and econom-
ics or politics in order to be able to chart the contours of the work 
that oil is doing for us in talking about petro-states or oil politics. 
Ryszard Kapuscinski, the brilliant Polish journalist (recently deceased), 
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noted that, “oil is a fairy tale…and like all fairy tales a bit of a lie.”12 
Oil is a natural resource and a commodity, perhaps the mother of all 
commodities. It happens to be the fuel of our modern, turbo-charged, 
hydrocarbon capitalism and an item of exchange capable of yielding 
unimaginable wealth, or “Black Gold.” In the long march toward the 
modern world-system, mass commodities of various sorts—sugar, sil-
ver, slaves, palm oil, petroleum—have been its beasts of burden. They 
have come to serve not only as markers for entire epochs—the Era of 
Slavery, the Age of Oil—but to enter the world market bearing the hall-
mark of what Hannah Arendt once called, “the original sin of primitive 
accumulation,”13 dripping with blood and dirt. Mass commodities, 
with their blood and dirt still attached, have always provided Nigeria’s 
and the Niger Delta’s entry point into the world economy, its calling 
card to the capitalist cosmos.
If the commodity is what Karl Marx called the economic cell form 
of capital, then oil is a perfect expression of contemporary capitalism’s 
most basic genetic material. Oil’s power as a commodity in the market 
derives from its two-fold identity. It comes first with its usefulness, 
its expediency, and then with its price tag. Both seem straightforward 
and unambiguous. Yet the pricing of oil is mysterious and bewilder-
ing, part of a world of appearances that obscures the operations of the 
system of which oil is part. Walter Benjamin, the great German critic, 
said that the commodity has a phantom-like objectivity. Commodities 
are not what they seem and for this reason are subject to all manner 
of mystification; they come with their own aura. Ryszard Kapuscin-
ski was witness to the spectacular oil boom in West Asia during the 
1970s. In his book Shah of Shahs, he says oil “is a filthy, foul-smelling 
liquid that squirts obligingly up into the air and falls back to earth as a 
rustling shower of money.” It is a resource that “anesthetizes thought, 
blurs vision, corrupts…[it] kindles extraordinary emotions and hopes, 
since oil is above all a great temptation.”14 Oil has always been vested 
with enormous, often magical, powers. Sometimes I think we are too 
easily seduced by these deceits.
It is perhaps no surprise, then, that oil of all resources has been 
invested with almost Olympian transformative powers. Oil distorts the 
organic, natural course of development. Oil wealth ushers in an econ-
omy of hyper-consumption and spectacular excess: bloated shopping 
malls in Dubai and corrupt Russian “oilygarchs.” There is even a psy-
chological appellation to describe the condition: the Gillette Syndrome. 
El Dean Kohrs studied the booming coal town of Gillette, Wyoming, in 
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the 1970s, and was witness to how a commodity boom brought a corre-
sponding wave of crime, drugs, violence, and inflation. It would afflict 
new gas fields in Wyoming, indigenous oil communities in Ecuador, 
and the rough-and-tumble Russian oil fields of Siberia. Other scholars, 
like Michael Ross, argue that, “oil hinders democracy” (as if copper 
might promote constitutionalism). Oil revenues permit low taxes and 
encourage patronage, thereby dampening pressures for democracy. It 
endorses despotic rule through bloated militaries and creates a class 
of state-dependents employed in the modern industrial and service 
sectors, who are less likely to push for democracy.15 New York Times 
columnist and world-class autodidact Thomas Friedmann has even 
identified a “First Law of Petropolitics”: the higher the average global 
crude price of oil, the more free speech, free press, fair elections, an 
independent judiciary, the rule of law, and independent political par-
ties are eroded. Hugo Chavez is, of course, the law’s most devious 
exponent. In sum, the oil world is cursed—a “carbontocracy”—impov-
erished by its wealth.
I wish to take on three aspects of this variegated body of work as 
a way of opening up a larger argument about how to understand the 
dynamics of oil states, and specifically the relationship between oil, 
politics, and forms of rule. The first I shall call “rebellion as crime.” It 
speaks to the work of Paul Collier (and Michael Ross) and his World 
Bank comrades who address the economics of civil war. They offer 
an argument that oil provides a ground on which rebels can finance 
a self-interested and criminal movement against the state through the 
looting of oil resources.
The second, which I shall call “the territoriality/materiality claim,” 
is associated with a body of largely geographical work. I shall use 
Philippe Le Billon’s important research disseminated in 2005, which 
turns on the fact that oil has a specific materiality and a territoriality 
that shapes particular sorts of political outcomes, for example, coups 
or secessions.
The third, “the predation claim,” examines the idea of an oil insur-
gency or an oil rebellion rooted in the claim that the “lootability” of oil 
is central to grasping the character of the insurgency itself.16
In exploring (and departing from) these ideas, I want to provide a 
rather different analysis and shed some light on Mbembe’s question 
that opens the essay: why is oil so frequently the epicenter of violence? 
I also suggest that in states in which oil is a national resource (estab-
lished through statutory monopolies) and a territorial (i.e., place or 
regionally based) commodity, the centralization of oil revenues through 
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the state joint venture (I am using this term to cover a variety of legal-
institutional arrangements from production share agreements to ser-
vice contracts) provides a terrain on which we can explore Foucault’s 
claim that government is concerned with “men in their relations, their 
links, their imbrications with those things that are wealth, resources, 
means of subsistence… . [and] territory with its specific qualities.”17 In 
short, I want to explore the new governable spaces18 that emerge from 
“the oil complex.” They are violent and unstable, suggestive of a sort 
of political splintering and fragmentation. They seem to indicate that 
oil politics, including oil insurgency and the rebellion across the Niger 
Delta oil fields, works through complex forms of dispossession. What 
is on offer, then, is a recursive form of primitive accumulation (here I 
endorse Arendt’s idea of the essential repetition of the “original sin of 
robbery”) in which oil and violent rule are inextricably linked.
II. The Smash-and-Grab for African Oil
Among Washington’s chattering classes there is a deep concern, bor-
dering on panic, with the growing Chinese presence—diplomatic, eco-
nomic, and political—on the African continent. Driven in large measure 
by China’s aggressive expansion into the energy sector, “Sino-power” 
has been cast as part of a new “scramble for oil” against a backdrop 
of tight global oil markets and a post-9/11 U.S. obsession with energy 
security (in effect, a dovetailing of the Global War on Terror with the 
2001 Cheney Report’s trepidation over Middle East oil dependency.)19 
There are those, Frynas and Paulo for example, who argue that the oil 
scramble bears no affinity to its late 19th-century counterpart and that 
Sino oil power is much exaggerated. Historical parallels notwithstand-
ing, the African oil complex—the dense networks of actors and agents 
organized around the exploration and development of oil and gas—is 
being refigured by tectonic shifts in the pattern of oil operations.
First, Chinese oil contracts from the three largest oil companies (Sin-
opec, CNOOC, and CNPC, with a combined market value of $225 
billion) have mushroomed from virtually zero in 1995 to seventy con-
tracts in sixteen countries by 2007, covering a total acreage of more 
than 8.2 million sq. km.20 Chinese oil operations, predicated upon an 
“integrated independent energy and security model,” in short, mer-
cantilism, develop long-term stable agreements linked to large infra-
structure and aid projects sustained by China’s massive reserves of 
accumulated liquidity now in excess of $1 trillion.21 This is a strategy 
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that includes a number of other Asian national oil companies, most 
especially KNOC (Korea) and PETRONAS (Malaysia), constructing oil 
operations around self-contained mercantilist alliances, typically bi- or 
tri-lateral arrangements lubricated by aid, capital, and expertise.
Second, the Gulf of Guinea is a hot new and dynamic supply zone 
in the so-called “new Gulf states,” and has emerged as a major sup-
plier to the seemingly insatiable U.S. market. Its obvious geo-strate-
gic advantages—large and accessible reserves of light, sweet crudes, 
a large liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector, and proximity to North 
American markets—have all contributed to the fact that Nigeria alone 
supplies over 12% of total U.S. crude imports.
Not least, there are the twin developments of the new institutional 
and financial complexity of oil projects, especially deepwater offshore 
production and multi-train liquefied natural gas infrastructures, cou-
pled with what the industry sees as the assertive “petro-nationalism” 
of African oil-states and their national oil companies22 (the passing in 
2007 of an ambitious new local content law in Nigeria is simply one 
case in point).
Whether or not such a dynamic energy sector warrants the term 
“scramble,” oil investment is incontestably vast, diversified, and grow-
ing (for example, the six-train LNG plant on Bonny Island in Nigeria, 
with its attendant gas infrastructure, is already a $12 billion invest-
ment). The Cheney energy report highlighted the fact that the region 
is driven by a “huge exploration investment,” expected to contrib-
ute more than 30% of world liquid hydrocarbon production by 2010. 
Over the last five years, when new oil field discoveries have been very 
scarce, Africa contributed one in every four barrels of new petroleum 
discovered outside of North America. The West African Gulf of Guinea, 
encompassing the rich on- and offshore fields stretching from Nigeria 
to Angola, represented a key plank in the Bush administration’s alter-
native to the increasingly volatile and unpredictable oil-states of the 
Persian Gulf. Oil investment now represents over 50% of all foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in the continent, and more than 60% of all FDI 
in the top four FDI recipient countries. Almost 90% of all cross-border 
merger and acquisition activity since 2003 has been in the mining and 
petroleum sectors.23 Between 1995 and 2001, FDI inflow amounted to 
$7 billion per year, but almost two-thirds of the portfolio was destined 
for the three countries (Angola, Nigeria, and South Africa) in which oil 
FDI accounted for 90% of all FDI inflow. Naturally, the Gulf of Guinea 
figures centrally in this new African oil landscape. Within the West 
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African oil triangle, Nigeria rules the roost, currently producing 2.4 
million barrels per day (bpd) with an ambitious program to expand 
output to over 4 million bpd.
Running across this landscape of dynamic energy-capitalism is 
a deep vein of political volatility capable of roiling the commodity 
exchanges. Nowhere is this volatility more pronounced, and seem-
ingly intractable, than in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, a vast sedimentary 
and oil-rich basin of some 70,000 sq. km. and composed officially of 
nine states (Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta, Imo, Cross River, 
Ondo, and Edo), 185 local government areas (LGAs), and a population 
of roughly 28 million people. To put the matter starkly, the Niger Delta 
possesses a massive oil infrastructure—606 fields (40% off shore), 5,284 
wells, 7,000 kilometers of pipelines, ten export terminals, 275 flow 
stations, ten gas plants, four refineries, and a world class six-train 
liquefied natural gas installation on Bonny Island—that is more or 
less ungovernable. The ninth largest oil producer in the world, in the 
wake of the April 2007 elections (widely seen to be even worse than 
the fraudulent electoral process of 2003), is now tottering on the edge 
of chaos. Roughly half of the delta’s 3,000 communities have some sort 
of oil operations within their jurisdiction and the very presence of oil 
has been, almost invariably, a source of tension and conflict. Nigeria 
meets its OPEC quota yet currently something like 900,000 barrels per 
day are “deferred” (or shut-in) because of attacks on installations and 
personnel. Another 100,000 barrels per day are stolen (“bunkered”). 
To extend the metaphor, the entire corporate oil sector now resides 
pretty much in a bunker of its own, its staff and workers (to the extent 
they have not been repatriated or withdrawn from the oil fields) are 
shuttled around in military convoys. Collectively, this shut-in amounts 
to more than one-third of national output. Apparently this is the cost 
that the oil companies must bear for their “social license to operate,” as 
they put it. Yet it is not at all clear that the majors have a license at all. 
Sources put the figure of trained militants at more than 25,000 strong, 
commanding monthly salaries of over 50,000 nairas (N), well above the 
wage that can be plausibly commanded by an educated youth in the 
formal sector.
The Niger Delta (see Figure 1) has become the home of an oil insur-
gency.24 Remotely detonated car bombs and highly sophisticated arms 
and equipment are the tools of the trade. More than 250 foreign hos-
tages have been abducted in the past fifteen months and close to 1,000 
Nigerian workers have been detained or held hostage on facilities. 
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Major and often spectacular attacks on both on- and offshore facilities 
are endemic and can be perpetrated at will. Unlike during the 1980s 
or 1990s, militants are now willing and able to directly confront fed-
eral and state security forces. The vast cache of sophisticated arms is 
skillfully deployed in an environment (the mangrove creeks running 
for hundreds of miles along the Bight of Benin) in which the Nigerian 
security forces, to quote the new Vice-President Goodluck Jonathan, 
“cannot cope with the situation.”25 According to a World Bank report, 
more than 600 people have been killed in the course of these conflicts, 
often engagements between militias and the joint military task forces, 
since 2000. Pipeline breaks due to vandalism and sabotage have almost 
doubled between 1999 and 2004 (from 497 to 895). Product losses due 
to pipeline ruptures have grown steadily from 179,000 to 396,000 met-
ric tons over the same period (a figure roughly equal to four super-
tankers).26 The direct assaults on oil installations and infrastructure 
cost the Nigerian government $6.8 billion in revenue loss between 1999 
and 2004. In the last three years, that figure has increased dramatically. 
Figure 1
Macalester International  Vol. 24
90
Currently, the conflicts cost Nigeria $60 million per day, roughly $4.4 
billion per annum in damages and lost revenue.27 In May 2007, Nigeria 
drew upon $2.7 billion from its “domestic excess crude,” a windfall 
profits account, to plug revenue shortfalls from oil deferment. Presi-
dent Obasanjo ordered the military, in mid-2006, to adopt a “force for 
force” policy in the delta in a vain effort to gain control of the creeks. 
In early 2007, the Nigerian navy embarked upon its biggest sea maneu-
ver in two decades, deploying thirteen warships, four helicopters, and 
four boats to the Bight of Bonny to test “operational capability.” Yet the 
month of May 2007, according to a Norwegian consulting company, 
Bergen Risk Solutions, witnessed the largest monthly tally of attacks 
since the appearance of a shadowy but militarily well-armed insurgent 
group called the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
(MEND) eighteen months ago.28
Many of the oil-producing communities across the delta are torn 
apart by all manner of internal (for example, Nembe or Finima) or 
inter-community (Ogoni-Andoni) conflicts or both (Soku-Kula-Olua-
siri).29 There has certainly been no period since the first oil boom—
palm oil in the early 19th century—in which the delta has been in such 
turmoil, other than the civil war. The conflicts have an organic con-
nection to oil but their genealogies are complex. In some cases, com-
munities fight over land and territorial disputes over oil-bearing lands 
(Odiama); in some cases, they are secessional disputes, often of great 
historical depth, driven by the prospect of access to oil rents and com-
pany cash payments (Okrika) compounded by party politics; in other 
instances, youth groups struggle among themselves or with elders 
over access to companies (Nembe); and sometimes they are sectional 
and communal, as ethnic communities in multi-ethnic settings, rural 
and urban, struggle over the establishment of electoral wards or local 
government councils to ensure that they too can feed at the oil trough 
(Warri). The social forces are at once ethnic, generational, gender, class 
(chiefs, politicians), corporate, and, of course, state (military and secu-
rity). Conflicted communities across the oil fields embody complex 
configurations of such forces. The social field of violence in which the 
delta is now embroiled is a multi-headed hydra.
According to the 2007 UNDP report, there are currently 120–150 
“high risk and active violent conflicts” in the three key oil-produc-
ing states. At the heart of these contested communities is the “restive 
youth problem,”30 as it is known in local parlance, a tectonic shift in 
intergenerational politics in the region that has occurred over the last 
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two to three decades, driven by the consequences of structural adjust-
ment and state authoritarianism, and given a huge boost of adrenaline 
by the return to civilian rule in 1999. Youth, as a social category of 
great historical and cultural depth, provides an idiom in a “geronto-
cratic” and authoritarian setting in which power, secrecy, and some-
times violence can be harnessed as a sort of counter-movement, built 
on the ruins of failed oil development.31 Youth organizations have 
multiplied and metastasized. They often refigure cultural traditional 
institutions like the egbesu, agaba, or mutual support club.32 Since the 
1980s they have directly attempted to capture organs of community 
power (for example, Community Development Committees), but also 
to directly challenge gerontocratic rule. Not least, they have adopted 
an increasingly militant stance, acting as the erstwhile liberators—van-
guard movements, in effect—for the oppressed of the region. As Gore 
and Pratten properly express it, youth represent “shadow structures.” 
They are:
covert and secret forms of organization…salient to the practices of every-
day life. As a basis for access to resources and the distribution of power, 
these modes of collective youth action are generated at the intersect-
ing and interfacing of top-down modes of governance and bottom-up 
responses to disorder…expressed as counter-movements against mar-
ginalization and coercion.33
The social field of youth violence is as complex as it is variegated, 
a diversity captured in the breadth of the local lexicon itself (militias, 
“area boys,” vigilantes, gangs, cults, secret societies).34 One of the chal-
lenges of any analysis of youth militancy in the delta is precisely to 
understand the shifting alliances and networks that link sometimes 
shadowy and subterranean groups of rather different provenance and 
politics.35 But the well of youth rage (there is no other way to put it) is 
deep and has shown itself capable of hewing a very rough-and-tumble 
political (dis)order. A large survey of Niger Delta oil communities by 
Oyefusi in 2007 discovered that 5% of the population felt satisfied with 
the status quo while an astonishing 36.23% revealed a “willingness or 
propensity to take up arms against the state.”36 More generally, survey 
data shows clearly that many of the youth grievances—poverty, lack 
of employment, minimal educational opportunities—are felt widely 
across the region, beyond a generation who would identify as mili-
tants.37 A far greater proportion of deltans perceive economic neglect 
Macalester International  Vol. 24
92
(“marginalization,” in local parlance) than other regions in the federa-
tion and more than 50% of all respondents identify governance as the 
fundamental problem working against their opportunity to benefit 
from oil.38
It is really an extraordinary train wreck and it represents not just 
the conversion of the delta into what Ikelegbe calls “a region of insur-
rection,”39 but a radical shift from the days of Saro-Wiwa’s nonviolent 
struggle of the late 1980s and early 1990s to outright insurgency.40 In 
some respects, the current crisis confirms Ken Saro-Wiwa’s prescient 
and bleak prediction in 1990 about the “coming war” in the delta: “the 
people must be allowed to join in the lucrative sale of oil,” he said, to 
avoid “the cataclysm that is building up.”41 Small arms and light weap-
ons are now endemic in the delta and the “pace of acquisition and the 
lethality of weapons is increasing.”42 Chief Philip Asiodu’s confident 
claim two decades ago that the oil-producing communities “cannot 
threaten the stability of the country nor affect its continued economic 
development”43 now seems naïve or delusional. The Oputa Commis-
sion (the Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission), sitting 
in Port Harcourt in February 2001, focused much of its attention on 
the Niger Delta and concluded, in the words of its Chairman, Chuk-
wudifu Oputa, that the situation was political dynamite.44 With the 
emergence of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
(MEND) in late 2005, the dynamite had exploded. MEND’s spokes-
person referred to a “malignant growth” spreading violently and fast 
becoming “Nigeria’s Vietnam.”45 The mix of violence, corruption, and 
theft has reached a tipping point. Managing Director of Chevron, Jay 
Prior, cryptically observed that, “I have run companies that have had 
less production than is being bunkered in this country.”46 How has it 
come to this? Does it all amount to, as Collier and others suggest, little 
more than a vast criminal syndicate overlaid with a patina of social 
justice rhetoric?
III. Oil Nation: Nigeria’s “Perfect Storm”
The rise of Nigeria as a strategic player in the world of oil geopolitics 
has been dramatic. It has occurred in the wake of a bloody civil war 
that ended in 1970, in which several million people were killed. In the 
late 1950s, petroleum products were trivial, amounting to less than 
2% of total exports. Between 1960 and 1973, oil output exploded from 
just over 5 million barrels to over 600 million barrels. Government oil 
revenues, in turn, accelerated from N66 million in 1970 to more than 
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N10 billion in 1980. Over the last two years, oil and gas revenues have 
averaged roughly $50 billion and nominal GDP is in excess of $100 bil-
lion.47 A multi-billion dollar oil sector with a set of expectations driven 
by the aura of “Black Gold” has proven to be little more than a night-
mare.48 An El Dorado, Nigeria is not. To inventory the “achievements” 
of Nigerian oil development is a salutary exercise: 85% of oil revenues 
accrue to 1% of the population. Perhaps $100 billion of the $400 billion 
in revenues has simply gone missing since 197049 (the anti-corrup-
tion chief, Nuhu Ribadu, claimed that in 2003, 70% of the country’s oil 
wealth was stolen or wasted; by 2005, it was “only” 40%). Almost $130 
billion in capital flight occurred between 1970 and 1996.50 Over the 
period 1965–2004, the per capita income fell from $250 to $212; income 
distribution deteriorated markedly over the same period. Between 1970 
and 2000, the number of Nigerians subsisting on less than one dollar a 
day grew from 36% to more than 70%, from 19 million to a staggering 
90 million. According to the International Monetary Fund, oil “did not 
seem to add to the standard of living” and “could have contributed to 
a decline in the standard of living.”51 Over the last decade, GDP per 
capita and life expectancy have both fallen, according to World Bank 
estimates.52 Nigeria has become a model failure, a reference point for 
other resource-dependent states. After the discovery of oil in Mongolia, 
a leader pronounced, “we do not want to become another Nigeria.”53
What is on offer in the name of petro-development is the terrify-
ing and catastrophic failure of secular nationalist development.54 It is 
sometimes hard to grasp the full consequences and depth of such a 
claim. From the vantage point of the Niger Delta—but no less from the 
vast slum worlds of Kano or Lagos—development and oil wealth is a 
cruel joke. The costs of oil are experienced, not only in class terms, but 
equally importantly, geographically. The paradoxes, contradictions, 
and traumatic costs of oil are nowhere greater than on the oil fields of 
the Niger Delta where it has wrought only poverty, state violence, and 
a dying ecosystem.55 The recent UNDP report on human development 
in the delta was unflinching in its assessment: the “appalling develop-
ment situation”56 reflects the uncontestable and shameful fact that after 
a half century of oil development “the vast resources from an interna-
tional industry have barely touched pervasive local poverty.”57 In 2003, 
the government launched a joint military task force called Operation 
Restore Hope, named ludicrously after the ruinous U.S. operations in 
Somalia, to secure the delta. Yet government’s presence, Ike Okonta 
notes, “is only felt in the form of the machine gun and jackboots.”58 
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By conservative estimates, there have been over 7,000 oil spills since 
1970. Gas flaring, while down by 40% from its historic high (80%), 
still produces 70 million metric tons of carbon emissions (“a substan-
tial proportion of worldwide greenhouse gas”59), amounting to a loss 
of $2.5 billion annually in associated gas.60 According to the World 
Wildlife Fund report released in 2006, the delta is one of the most pol-
luted places on the face of the earth. A much-publicized Commission 
of Nobel Laureates on Peace, Equity and Development in the Niger 
Delta Region concluded that the “wealth earmarked for the region” 
was “largely stolen by politicians.” The frustration and violence, they 
concluded, was “rising…and getting worse.”61 It is all too easy to be 
apocalyptic in tone—and to endorse a certain sort of catastrophism 
that afflicts so much writing about the continent—but if truth be told, 
Executive Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crime Commis-
sion (EFCC) Nuhu Ribadu was surely right when he observed that the 
Niger Delta situation was “not being taken seriously” and might “end 
up like…Somalia.”62 Or perhaps Colombia?
The heart of the Nigerian development failure is the politics of 
unearned income.63 Its central dynamic is the fiscal sociology of access 
to and distribution of oil rents.64 The Nigerian petro-state—a particular 
form of state-formation driven by particular forms of rent—is com-
prised of several key institutional elements: (1) a statutory monopoly 
over mineral exploitation (there are almost 50 acts and laws that con-
stitute control over and regulate state control of petroleum and gas), 
(2) a national (state) oil company (the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Company, NNPC) that operates through joint ventures with oil majors, 
which are granted territorial concessions (blocs) as Oil Prospecting 
Licenses or Oil Mining Leases, (3) the security apparatuses of the state 
(often working in a complementary fashion with the private security 
forces of the companies) which ensure that costly (and vulnerable) 
investments are secured, and (4) a political mechanism by which oil 
revenues are distributed. In sharp contrast to the broad-based tax state, 
the petro-state contains all manner of “pathologies” derived from oil.65 
Examples include autonomy from citizens, external intervention, vul-
nerability to subversion, non-transparency, ineffective bureaucracy, 
“coupism,” and so on.66 Within this nexus, the national oil company 
stands as the blackest of black holes, or a dark star of theft, corruption, 
and fictional accounts typically under the direct control of the Presi-
dent. State oil, said one commentator, “is like a party with the lights 
out and the music on full blast.”
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The failure of the petro-state resides in the oil revenue distribution 
question—whether in a federal system like Nigeria or in an autocratic 
monarchy like Saudi Arabia—and is an indispensable part of under-
standing the combustible politics of the oil complex. Rentier-capital-
ism in Nigeria turns on four key distribution mechanisms.67 These are 
the federal account (rents appropriated directly by the federal state); 
a state derivation principle (the right of each state to a proportion of 
the taxes that its inhabitants are assumed to have contributed to the 
federal exchequer); the Federation Account (or States Joint Account), 
which allocates revenue to the states on the basis of need, population, 
and other criteria; and a Special Grants Account. The Special Grants 
account includes monies designated directly for the Niger Delta, for 
example through notoriously corrupt designated entities like the Oil 
and Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission, founded 
in 1993 and abandoned in the late 1990s; the Niger Delta Develop-
ment Commission,68 founded in 2000; and the new (2006) Consoli-
dated Council on Socio-Economic Development of the Coastal States 
of Nigeria. The quantum of oil revenues around which these distribu-
tive mechanisms operate is, in turn, a product of the Memorandum of 
Understanding associated with joint venture activities in which com-
panies and the NNPC have equity. Since the 1970s, state equity has 
been on the order of 55–60%. While the proportion of each barrel as 
government “take” is directly related to oil price, the government por-
tion per barrel (equity, taxes, rents, and royalties) is never less than 
70%. Under current conditions it may be 90% or more.69
Over time, the relative weight of central versus direct state (regional) 
control has shifted as a function the often-violent political struggles 
among ethnic majorities that shaped the post-civil war development 
of the federation (1967–1970). Since 1960, there has been a general 
process of radical fiscal centralism, a process that simultaneously refers 
to the extent to which the federal center controls revenues (through 
what became in 1979 the federation account) and the degree to which 
it retains revenues for federal use (increasingly under military rule 
through “special accounts” outside of the federation account). There 
was in effect a double movement in operation over the last forty years: 
on the one side, the multiplication of states, all of which are largely 
dependent upon central (oil) revenues; and on the other, a series of 
statutory monopolies over mineral (including oil and gas) resources 
and land (put in place between 1967 and 1978 and continued to date 
through the 1999 constitution, or Decree No. 24, which was itself the 
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retention of the 1979 constitution, adopted in the last hours of mili-
tary rule prior to Obasanjo’s tenure70). The “evil twin” of the control 
over resources was a state-centered revenue allocation process that by 
definition vastly enhanced the power of the state.71 One expression of 
this centralism is the extent to which the oil and gas sector has been 
run, especially since the Babbangida period, as a personal fiefdom of 
the Presidency. (President Obasanjo directly controlled the oil and gas 
portfolio throughout his two terms.) A second is the fact that a series 
of revenue allocation commissions have changed the metric of alloca-
tion such that the principle of derived income (states can command a 
proportion of the revenue from resources within their territory) has 
diminished while the oil revenue flowing to the federal account by 
other distributional criteria has expanded dramatically.
The history of revenue allocation is far too complex to rehearse 
here. Suffice it to say that the creation of new states in 1967, in the con-
text of a secessional war and enormous ethno-regional enmity, raised 
a panoply of political challenges.72 Among them were questions of 
how monies from the central bourse (then named the Distributable 
Pool Account, or DPA) were to be shared. How would the new states 
share the assets of the regions from which they were created? How 
would the fiscal demands of new administrative machineries be met?73 
From the end of the Second World War, revenue allocation had been 
handled in an ad hoc fashion through fiscal commissions that gave 
a priority to derivation as a principle of allocation for mining rents, 
coupled with shared regional revenues from the DPA. But between 
1967 and 1979, the DPA was enlarged because mining and other rents 
directed to it were increased and, conversely, the derivation principle 
was de-emphasized. Over the period 1946–1979, the federal appro-
priation declined from roughly 82% of all government revenues in 
1950 to roughly 60% during the 1960s, then subsequently grew to 81% 
by 1979. In 1969, a set of principles was introduced for a simple sys-
tem of revenue sharing among the states (including criteria such as 
population and equality of states). In 1979, the Federation Account 
was created into which virtually all revenues collected by government 
were to be paid. A strict formula was established in 1982 (subsequently 
amended in 1984 and 1992) for sharing revenues among the three tiers 
(so-called vertical allocation): federal government (typically between 
50% and 48%), states (varying between 30%–24%), and local govern-
ments (20%–15%). This system was endorsed in principle in 1999 at 
the return to civilian rule even though several important changes had 
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occurred in the political economy of revenue allocation during the 
military period.74 First, the federal government had in practice propor-
tionally increased its revenues through a number of special accounts 
(the National Economic Recovery Fund, the National Priority Projects 
Account, the Joint Ventures Cash Calls Payment Account, and so on); 
the derivation principle had shrunk to roughly 1% by the mid-1980s 
(from 50% in 1960); and the lower tiers of government had become 
almost wholly dependent upon centrally allocated revenues (rather 
than raising revenues themselves from state or local taxes). The share 
of the states’ revenue averaged 22% between 1971 and 1978, and wors-
ened cyclically thereafter (averaging 10% by the late 1990s). The com-
bined share of state and LGA revenues fell by almost 60% between 
1986 and 1996. In contrast, the federal government’s share grew from 
67% to 86% over the same period.
Overall, the relationship between state and LGA multiplication and 
centrally controlled oil wealth is quite clear. More and more political 
entities depend upon the limited and changeable oil revenues; the 
poorer the state or LGA, the greater the degree of dependence for 
revenues upon the federation account. Oil revenues constituted the 
vast proportion of all government revenues collected until the mid-
1990s. This dependency had a spatial expression in that oil-produc-
ing states experienced a net decline in the share of what previously 
had been deemed as their (i.e., derived) resources. As a consequence 
of the reconfiguration of revenues principles and distributional crite-
ria, the oil-producing states (composed largely of so-called ethnic or 
“oil minorities”) have lost and the non-oil-producing ethnic majori-
ties have gained—by fair means or foul. By 1980, the non-oil-produc-
ing states accounted for over 75% of total federal allocations; between 
1980 and 1990, the proportion of federal allocations to Rivers state, for 
example, fell from 10% to less than 3%.75 The changed topography of 
revenue allocation has its irregularities, however, and despite the clear 
overall historical trend since 2000, there has been the beginning of an 
important countermovement in the sense that the oil-producing states 
have expanded their control (in theory and practice) over national oil 
income through the derivation principle.76 In the past eight years, for 
instance, the delta states have received $30 billion in oil income; the 
2006 budgets for Rivers and Bayelsa states were respectively N168 and 
N125 billion.77 The history, nevertheless, of postcolonial Nigeria is the 
history of the reconfiguration of, and the Olympian struggles over, 
revenue allocation.
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The complex politics of fiscal centralization—and decentraliza-
tion—provides the ground upon which rest three important aspects of 
what one might call the “new” Nigerian political economy. The first is 
the decentralization of corruption associated with the vast increase in rev-
enue flows in the delta in conjunction with the increase of derivation to 
13% in 1999. In 2004, the four largest oil states received over two billion 
dollars capable of being pillaged; nowhere is this more so than in the 
wholly non-functional (and unaccountable) systems of local govern-
ment which have grown in absolute terms quite dramatically.78
Second is the democratization of the means of violence. In other words, 
the state monopoly on violent means of destruction has been undercut 
by the widespread deployment of arms locally by militia and other 
militants.79
And third is the rise (in part associated with changing revenue allo-
cation) of enormous power and wealth at the level of the state governors. 
They have become not only counterweights to the federal center but 
machine politicians, the regional “Godfathers,” in their own right.
This trio of forces frame what is called the “resource control debate” 
in the delta, a political movement with a deep history dating back at 
least to the issues raised by the Willinck Commission on the “fears” of 
the ethnic minorities in the delta during the 1950s.80 Propelled since the 
1980s by youth and other ethnic movements—and subsequently cap-
tured by the southern political classes from the oil-producing states as 
a means of providing political pressure on the revenue allocation pro-
cess81—the minority fears of the 1950s became minority grievances in 
the 1980s and minority militancy by the 1990s.82 Since 1999, Obasanjo 
has endeavored to maintain a balancing act, weighing a growing Niger 
Delta clamor for resource control backed by an insurgency against the 
array of political forces rooted in the hegemony of powerful northern 
and southern political interests. For example, the federal center has 
increased derivation to 13%, though it drew a line in the sand in its 
refusal to meet the delta delegation’s demands of 25% derivation or 
more during the 2005 National Political Reform Conference.83 Obasanjo 
has steadfastly refused to apologize for, or even acknowledge, the 
unwarranted violence and human rights violations by federal forces 
in the slaughter at Odi or Odioma,84 or acknowledge the casualties 
inflicted by the joint military task force in and around Warri. Yet he 
capitulated to Niger Delta demands over granting offshore littoral oil 
fields as amenable to derivation (largely in an effort to purchase sup-
port for his failed attempt at a third Presidential term). In sum, a hege-
monic deployment of force (militarization) and consent (purchasing 
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compromise through oil revenues) has pockmarked the state’s struggle 
to contain the resource control movement. I will take the Gramscian 
argument one stage further. From the vantage point of the subaltern 
classes for whom resource control has been the avatar of mobilization, 
the struggle (the balance of force and consent) has gradually shifted 
from a “war of position” (a discursive struggle to legitimate the call for 
resource control) to a “war of movement” (insurgency).
It is indisputable that the oil boom since the late 1990s and the surge 
of windfall oil profits as prices rose to $70 per barrel have inserted 
a vast influx of monies into the delta via state and local government 
structures. It is perfectly clear, however, that the actual disbursement 
of monies and the flow of oil revenues from Abuja to the oil-produc-
ing states are marked by massive malfeasance and diversion. In 2006, 
Rivers and Delta states, for example, received in excess of one billion 
dollars in federal revenues; in the first six months of 2006, the 23 local 
governments in Rivers state received more than $115 million in federal 
allocations (including derivation). There is a sense, then, in which the 
delta is awash in oil monies, notwithstanding the fact that nobody 
believes that the full complement of statutory allocations are received 
in their entirety by the oil-producing states85 (and here is a sharp con-
trast with, say, the mid-1980s, when derivation had plummeted to 
1% on the back of the oil price collapse). When the Movement for the 
Survival of the Ogoni People was founded in 1990, a plausible case 
could be made that the oil-producing states and the local councils were 
starved of oil revenues (the “politics of minority suffocation” was how 
the Association of Minority Oil States put it in 1992). Fifteen years later, 
this is a much harder case to make (writing in 2007, Human Rights 
Watch referred to a “vast increase in financial resources” since 199986).
Overlaid upon the Nigerian petro-state and its fiscal sociology is, 
in turn, a volatile mix of forces that give shape to the oil complex.87 
First, the geo-strategic interest in oil means that military (foreign and 
local, private and state) and other security forces are part of the local 
oil complex. Second, local and global civil society enters into the oil 
complex either through transnational advocacy groups concerned with 
human rights and the transparency of the entire oil sector, or through 
local social movements and NGOs fighting over the consequences 
of the oil industry and the accountability of the petro-state. Third, 
the transnational oil business—the majors, independents, indigenous 
operators, national oil companies, and the vast service industry—is 
actively involved in the process of local development through com-
munity development, corporate social responsibility, and “stakeholder 
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inclusion.” Fourth, the inevitable struggle over oil wealth—who con-
trols and owns it, who has rights over it, and how the wealth is to be 
deployed and used—inserts a panoply of local political forces (ethnic 
militias, paramilitaries, separatist movements, and so on) into the oper-
ations of the oil complex (the conditions in Colombia are a representa-
tive case). Fifth, multilateral development agencies (the IMF and the 
IBRD) and financial corporations like the export credit agencies appear 
as key “brokers” in the construction and expansion of the energy sec-
tors in oil-producing states (and latterly, the multilaterals are pressured 
to become the enforcers of transparency among governments and oil 
companies). Not least, there is the relationship between oil and the 
shady world of drugs, illicit wealth (oil theft, for example), mercenar-
ies, and the black market economy. The oil complex is a vast enclave of 
corporate, state, and military power88 of unimaginable robustness and 
reach, at once shadowy, intimidating, secret, corrupt, and violent, and 
now draped in the cloak of security, terror, and war.
It would be wrongheaded to see in the Caspian, in Colombia, or in 
the Gulf of Guinea identical oil complexes at work. They differ obvi-
ously in their historical, cultural, and political specificities. Yet they do 
all operate as enclaves of economic and political calculation, in essence 
a form of “governmentality” or rule, characterized by enormous tur-
bulence and wealth creation. In short, the oil complex looks very much 
like an embattled zone of the most primitive accumulation.89 Empiri-
cally, the current operations of the oil complex have been radically 
shaped by the forces of post-9/11 politics, the failure of postwar U.S. oil 
policy, and the tightness of global oil markets.90 In the face of support 
by neoconservative promoters and opportunistic Washington lobby-
ists, strategists at the Pentagon have invented a new security threat 
to increase funding for European Command’s footprint in Africa.91 
Recently, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs 
Teresa Whelan announced the discovery of a “new threat paradigm”: 
the threat of “ungoverned spaces” in Northwest and West Africa.92 In 
practice, all four of the military services (including an Africa Clear-
inghouse on security information, supported by a Pentagon think 
tank, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, housed at the National 
Defense University) are now implicated in the new scramble for the 
continent. Against a backdrop of spiraling militancy across the delta, 
U.S. interests have met up with European strategic concerns with the 
establishment of the “Gulf of Guinea Energy Security Strategy.” By 
December 2005, the American ambassador and the Managing Direc-
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tor of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation agreed “to estab-
lish four special committees to coordinate action against trafficking in 
small arms in the Niger Delta, bolster maritime and coastal security 
in the region, promote community development and poverty reduc-
tion, and combat money laundering and other financial crimes.”93 U.S. 
military activity increased from almost none in 2004 to “104 ship days” 
in 2006.94 The establishment of a new African command (AFRICOM) 
in February 2007, and the appointment of its first head, William (Kip) 
Ward, is the final capstone in the militarization of American energy 
security policy in Africa.
Energy security, it turns out, is a terrifying hybrid, a perplexing 
“doubleness,” containing the old and the new—primitive accumula-
tion and American militarism coupled to the war on terror.95 Into this 
vortex of forces descends a set of other global and imperial forces: on 
the one side, the presence of aggressive Chinese (and other Asian) oil 
companies and, on the other, the new imperial intentions of the South 
African energy companies. Put into the mix the resurgence of Islamism 
in Nigeria (and indeed across the Sahelian belt) and the political clout 
of urban evangelical Christianity across the southern oil-producing 
conurbations, and one has the makings of a “perfect storm” of instabil-
ity, violence, and conflict.96
IV. The Niger Delta: An Ungovernable Space
It is a measure of a certain sort of notoriety when Nigerian politics 
reaches the pages of Vanity Fair, penned no less by a prize-winning 
journalist and writer who, to the best of my knowledge, knows nothing 
of Africa or, in this case, the Niger Delta.97 Sebastian Unger’s account of 
Ijaw militants operating in the oil-rich creeks of the Niger Delta is little 
more than tabloid journalism, but the realities to which it speaks have 
been an extraordinary combination of the theatrical and the incendiary, 
worthy perhaps of any tabloid’s scrutiny. On 15 September 2005, Diepr-
eye Alamieyeseigha, the Governor of Bayelsa State, which is a major 
oil-producing state in the heart of the Ijaw homeland, was arrested by 
British security agencies at a London airport (a trip purportedly made 
to undertake cosmetic surgery) on three counts of money laundering 
(to the tune of 1.8 million pounds). The Governor’s arrest—designed 
to send a signal to unruly Governors everywhere in the run up to the 
2007 elections and Obasanjo’s ultimately fruitless effort to run for a 
third term—clearly involved close collaboration between the Obasanjo 
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and Blair governments. Released on $1.25 million bail in early October, 
Alamieyeseigha dramatically escaped from house detention in central 
London (disguised as an old woman) and appeared rather magically 
in the capital of Bayelsa, Yenagoa, on November 20 to adoring crowds 
after, as far as we can tell, an extraordinary escape via Paris, Yaoundé, 
and finally by small boat along the creeks by the Cameroon-Nigeria 
border.98 On 9 December, amidst considerable political confusion, he 
was seized by police in Government House after the state House of 
Assembly had voted 17–24 to impeach him. All of this occurred under 
the tight security presence of the Joint Task Force and the State Secu-
rity Services (SSS).99
Shortly after the London arrest, on 21 September 2005, against a 
backdrop of deepening militancy and oil-supply disruption and 
undemocratic maneuvers by President Obasanjo to quite literally pur-
chase the support of the senate for his third term ambitions, Alhaji 
Asari-Dokubo, the charismatic and savvy leader of the Niger Delta 
People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF)—an insurgent militia force fighting, 
by its own account, for resource control and self-determination in the 
eastern delta—was arrested by Federal forces on treason charges. Asari, 
a forty-year-old son of a Calabar judge, former Ijaw Youth Congress 
(IYC) President, and sometime political operative for the Governor 
of Rivers State, was arrested by police in the Rivers State’s Governor’s 
house in a sting operation and was taken to Abuja in spite of the fact 
that ostensibly a peace settlement between some of the Niger Delta 
militants and the government had been brokered in October 2004 by 
Obasanjo himself.100 Asari has been held in Abuja in SSS custody and 
appeared in February 2007 to stand trial amidst claims that his previ-
ous unruly behavior in court justified the decision to hold the proceed-
ing with Dokubo in absentia. In something of a circus atmosphere, 
Asari referred to the judge as an “idiot” and the eighty security agents 
in the courtroom were unclear as to whether and how the accused was 
to be removed from the courtroom.101
Finally, in what proved to be a trifecta of political crises for the Ijaw 
community, the Central Bank reported to the Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission on 6 October 2005 that the head of Allstate Trust 
Bank and Ijaw capitalist, Chief Ebimiti Banigo, was guilty of corrup-
tion. He was subsequently arrested and the bank was consequently 
closed, amidst the loss of substantial personal savings by many deposi-
tors in Rivers state. All of these events—in effect the arrest and deten-
tion of three major Ijaw notables—were inevitably read as a political 
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attack by Obasanjo’s government on a region (the Niger Delta) and 
people (the Ijaw) that had been at loggerheads with the federal center, 
a hostility marked both by the collapse of the national CONFAB in 
2005 on the allocation of oil revenues (in which the delta representa-
tives led by Oronto Douglas walked out) and the militarization of the 
delta under the auspices of two special military task forces (Operation 
Restore Hope and Operation Flush Out) instructed to adopt a “shoot to 
kill” policy as the oil fields descended into chaos.
Out of this vortex of events—one part soap opera, one part machine 
politics—there emerged in late 2005, in a most dramatic fashion, a 
hitherto unknown group of masked insurgents, the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), claiming to be a “union of 
all relevant militant groups,”102 and whose public face is a shifting and 
sometimes contentious cadre of leaders (and aliases), including Major-
General Godswill Tamuno, Tom Pollo, Oyinye Alaibe, Cynthia White, 
and the eloquent spokesperson, Gbomo Jomo. After its massive attack 
on the Opobo pipeline in Delta State in December 2005,103 MEND began 
calling for the international community to evacuate from the Niger 
Delta by 12 February or “face violent attacks.” In a fantastically auda-
cious series of forays, MEND struck an oil vessel belonging to TIDEX 
Nigeria on 11 January 2006, fifteen kilometers offshore. Four workers 
were kidnapped (and reportedly released for a N120 million ransom), 
shutting in over 100,000 bpd. On 15 January, thirteen members of the 
Joint Task Force were killed during an attack on the Shell Benisede 
flow station, and in late January an AGIP platform and its riverfront 
Port Harcourt offices were attacked and eight policemen were killed. 
On 18 January, an email promised “our operations will shift from the 
creeks to the cities” and beginning 1 February 2006, there would be 
“more aggressive tactics aimed at oil company workers.”104 Following 
an earlier ultimatum and a promise to reduce Nigeria export capacity 
by 30%, on 15 February, MEND declared a “state of emergency” and 
the launch of Operation Black February to demonstrate “its rugged 
guerilla wit and dogged intelligence in hunting down every foreign 
foot.”105 Then, in the wake of a purported peace accord held in Yena-
goa on 11 February, the joint task force embarked upon a vicious aerial 
bombardment of Ijaw villages in Okerenkoko territory (the heartland 
of the Gbaramantu clan), ostensibly to bomb oil bunkering barges. In 
retaliation, on 18 February, MEND launched the most audacious and 
coordinated of its attacks. Forty rebels overpowered guards and mili-
tary on Willbros barge 318 (nine foreign hostages were taken) and sub-
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sequently destroyed the offshore Forcados crude loading platform, the 
Ekeremore-Yeye manifold, and the NNPC Escravos-Lagos gas pipeline 
in Chanomi Creek. In a single day, approximately 20% of output was 
compromised.
The political agenda of MEND was not clear in the weeks of late 
December 2005 except that it self identified as a “guerilla movement” 
whose “decisions like its fighters are fluid.” In fact, in a press release 
by email—this is the modality of their politically savvy, Subcomman-
dante-Marcos-like exhortations and pronouncements—Jomo claimed 
that MEND was “apolitical” in structures and fighters “were not com-
munists…or revolutionaries. [They] are just very bitter men.”106 There 
was, in fact, a clear political platform—in spite of a welter of email 
denials calling an Oporoza-based Ijaw militant group, the Federated 
Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC), a “tribal assembly;” claim-
ing to have “co-opted” the NDPVF; rejecting any connection with oil 
bunkering; and asserting it is not “an Ijaw militia group.”107 In a signed 
statement by field commander Tamuno Godswill in early February, 
MEND’s demands were clearly outlined:
•  Immediate and unconditional release of Alhaji Asari-Dokubo
•  Immediate and unconditional release of Governor Alamieyeseigha
•  Immediate and unconditional release of youth leader Joshua 
Macaiva
•  Immediate and unconditional demilitarization of the Niger delta
•  Immediate payment of $1.5 billion compensation from Shell 
approved by the Nigerian National Assembly covering four decades 
of environmental degradation.108
In an interview with Karl Maier on 21 February 2006, Jomo made 
it clear that MEND had “no intention of breaking up Nigeria” but 
also had no intention of dealing directly with the government, which 
“knows nothing about rights or justice.” Resource control meant that 
the states would “directly manage” oil. Other communiqués reiter-
ated that these demands were not pecuniary and “we shall receive no 
money from any quarters.”109
Into 2006, MEND’s claim that it was capable of delivering a “crip-
pling blow” to the oil industry was increasingly borne out. More than 
fifteen Nigerian soldiers were killed between May and August 2006, 
and there were at least three kidnappings per month in the first half 
of 2006. (Typically, the hostages are all released following the pay-
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ment of substantial ransoms by the government, although it is unclear 
whether these payments are being made to MEND).110 The escalation 
of attacks (44 in 2006, 19 in the first three months of 2007), includ-
ing electronically detonated car bombings, brazen attacks on govern-
ment and military buildings, massive disruption of oil installations 
deploying sophisticated military equipment, and the audacious kid-
napping of workers of virtually every nationality (including Chinese 
and South Koreans), sometimes from platforms 40–60 km offshore, 
have confirmed the worst fears of the oil industry. In the deteriorating 
environment, many oil companies have withdrawn personnel and cut 
back production. By mid-2006, there was 500,000–600,000 barrels per 
day deferment, meeting MEND’s earlier goal of a 30% shut-in. Julius 
Berger, the largest construction company in the country, announced 
its withdrawal from the Niger Delta and many other companies began 
to withdraw personnel as oil workers were increasingly reticent to be 
posted there (many of whom were holed up in Lagos hotels). President 
Obasanjo bolstered the Joint Military Task Force in the Delta, but the 
seeming ease with which MEND can operate (“we navigate the creeks 
in pitch blackness,” crowed Jomo) and overcome local security forces 
suggests that the MEND “freedom fighters” control the creeks uncon-
tested.
The violence has continued and, indeed, deepened. In April 2006, 
two car bombs—one at the Bori Military Camp in Port Harcourt, the 
other in the midst of 200 oil tankers in Ekpan Delta State adjacent to 
the Warri refinery111—were deployed as “warning blasts,” threaten-
ing more to come. According to the Centre for Strategic and interna-
tional Studies, 123 expatriate hostages have been taken since January 
2006 (until early March 2007) and there have been 42 attacks on oil 
installations.112 Against a backdrop of escalating attacks on oil facilities 
and a proliferation of kidnappings, the Joint Revolutionary Council 
(apparently an umbrella group for insurgents) threatened a “Black 
November” as an “all out attack on oil operating companies.”113 A 
month earlier, MEND launched a brazen attack by 50 fighters on the 
Central Police Station and State Criminal Investigation Department in 
Port Harcourt, keeping the full combined force of the police and army 
at bay for six hours, and successfully withdrawing to the creeks after 
freeing one of their “commanders,” Saboma George, a former NDV 
militant who broke with Ateke. As of the fall of 2008, the residence of 
the new Vice- President-elect (the Governor of Bayelsa State) has been 
bombed, Chevron has temporarily shut down operations, there was a 
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massive pipeline explosion at Bomu, and a total of 900,000 barrels of 
oil per day are currently shut in (30% of official production). It is quite 
unclear, when located on this larger canvas, what Petroleum Minister 
Edmund Daukoru could possibly have meant when he announced to 
OPEC in February 2007 in Greece that, “the worst is over” and that, “it 
is a very, very temporary thing.”114
The rise of MEND—and its complex and shifting relationship to 
other insurgent groups, such as the Martyrs Brigade and the Coalition 
for Military Action in the Niger Delta (COMA)—marks a watershed in 
the turbulent history of the delta oil fields, but it arises on the back of 
a long arc of deepening violence and protest across the oil fields, espe-
cially since the late 1990s. The periodization of this deepening conflict 
is, however, far from clear.115 During the 1970s, communities aired 
their grievances to oil companies and occasionally to government, typ-
ically in an uncoordinated way. In fact, Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni 
(before he founded MOSOP) laid out these issues clearly as early as 
1968, during the civil war! The first civic organizational flowering 
around the oil question in the delta occurred in the mid-1980s (during 
the Buhari “opening”), followed by a period of mass ethnic political 
mobilization led by the Ogoni movement up to the mid-1990s, but also 
the establishment of political groups like the Ijaw National Congress 
(INC) and the Chicoco Movement in the 1990s. Women’s groups were 
some of the foundational protestors, elevating the struggle in the mid-
1980s and 1990s (such as the 1984 Ogharefe and Ekpan uprisings, and 
those by Ogoni and other groups in 1994 and 1995). They were espe-
cially prominent in the July 2002 protests, led by Itsekeri women near 
Ugborodo (Escravos) and by Ijaw women from the Gbaramantu and 
Egbema clans in the Dibi and Olero Creeks.116 Thereafter, a number of 
ethnic and pan-ethnic youth movements, marked by the 1997 found-
ing in Eleibiri of the Chicoco movement and, in 1998, the founding of 
the IYC and the drafting of the Kaiama Declaration, signaled a new 
phase of both tactics and deepening militancy. The period between 
1998 and 2000 was especially turbulent across the entire delta as mili-
tary forces responded violently and with impugnity. Warri went up in 
flames in 1997 and 1999, strikes crippled the LNG plant at Bonny in 
1999, sixty-four Shell staff were held hostage in Isokoland in 1998, a 
pan-Eket group (Afigh Iwaad Ekid) closed Mobil operations in Akwa 
Ibom State, while there were 114 line-breaks in the Port Harcourt-Warri 
pipeline in two months in late 1999 and early 2000.117 By 2002–03, there 
were a number of explicitly militant movements, usually referred to 
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as militias. These include the Egbesu Boys of Africa, Federated Niger 
Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC), MOSIEND, and Niger Delta Volun-
teer Force.118 Some were military spin-offs from non-militant groups, 
such as the IYC. Some operated by building explicit alliances and con-
nections with multifarious cult and vigilante groups (some university 
based) and drug-related urban gangs with a variety of both political 
and criminal goals.119
The appearance of MEND marked a new phase in terms of strategic 
capacity but also in the “franchise” character of the insurgency, link-
ing to and speaking for a number of militias and rebels. Whether it is, 
as Okonta suggests, not an organization but “an idea” is difficult to 
assess.120 Certainly the MEND militias operate with ease in and around 
Warri. The leadership appears, as Okonta says, articulate and politi-
cally savvy. But MEND emerged, and is inseparable from, a number 
of local and regional issues, the most important of which are the long-
standing antagonisms between the oil companies, especially Chevron 
in the Gbaramantu and Egbema clan territories, and the struggle over 
the creation of local government councils in Warri (itself a long fester-
ing inter-ethnic struggle) that broke open in 1997. MEND has, of course, 
been framed by a wider and pan-ethnic struggle for resource control. 
At the same time, strife was detonated, so to speak, by what Ijaw see 
as a deepening assault on their aspirations, or what Oboko Bello calls 
“being cut off from being a nation” under President Obasanjo. The 
extraordinarily violent gunship and helicopter attacks on Okerenkoko 
in February 2006 and the assault by the Joint Task Force on MEND in 
the wake of a truce brokered between MEND and the government in 
August of the same year were consistent with a much longer history 
of state violence across the Warri axis. In this sense, Okonta is surely 
right to say that MEND is “the violent child of the deliberate and long 
running constriction of the public space in the Niger delta…Behind 
the mask of MEND is a political subject forced to pick up an AK-47 to 
restore his rights.”121
Whether or not it is an umbrella organization, a franchise, or an 
“un-united hydra,”122 MEND emerges on the back of a long process 
of mobilizing from below and of widening the social base. It has wel-
comed the institutional incorporation of various youth groups in com-
plex and unstable networks. MEND, for example has allegedly made 
an alliance with the Outlaws, a renegade group previously linked to 
the Icelanders. It has made a shift from nonviolent protest and demon-
strations to occupations, sabotage, vandalism, and outright organized 
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armed assault, including, since 1998, the tactical use of kidnapping and 
ransom. Running across this story is the deepening involvement of the 
organized militias, since the late-1980s, in various economic “enter-
prises,” including oil bunkering (and refining), ransoms, extortion, 
protection services, and the drug trade. To see oil theft or hostage-tak-
ing as either new or as evidence of a simple linear shift from grievance 
to greed is not helpful, in part because one person’s greed is another’s 
grievance and because inevitably this mix of forces—always open to 
different definitions and meanings—always operates as part of a com-
plex whole. In this sense, the oil insurgency in the Niger Delta is not 
terribly different from any insurgency in the history of militant politi-
cal struggles anywhere.
By any estimation, the costs of this oil insurgency are vast. A report 
prepared for the Nigerian National Petroleum Company, published in 
2003 and entitled Back from the Brink (before the latest insurgency took 
off), painted a very gloomy “risk audit” for the Delta.123 NNPC esti-
mated that between 1998 and 2003, there were 400 “vandalizations” on 
company facilities each year (and 581 between January and September 
2004); oil losses amounted to over $1 billion annually. Already by 2003, 
oil supply had been compromised by 750,000 bpd as a result of attacks 
on oil installations across the region. In April 2004, another wave of 
violence erupted around oil installations (at the end of April, Shell 
lost production of up to 370,000 barrels per day, largely in the western 
delta), this time amidst the presence of armed insurgencies. Two so-
called ethnic militias, led by Ateke Tom (Niger Delta Vigilante [NDV]) 
and Alhaji Asari Dokubo (NDPVF), each driven and partly funded by 
oil monies and actively deployed (and paid) by high-ranking politi-
cians as political thugs during elections in the Port Harcourt-Okrika-
Kalabari axis, have transformed the political landscape of the delta. 
Within the first six months of 2006, there were nineteen attacks on for-
eign oil operations and more than $2.187 billion lost in oil revenues; the 
Department of Petroleum Resources claims this figure represents 32% 
of the revenue the country generated that year. The Nigerian govern-
ment claims that between 1999 and 2005, oil losses amounted to $6.8 
billion, but in November 2006, the managing director of Shell Nigeria 
reported that the loss of revenues due to “unrest and violence” was $61 
million per day (a shut-in of about 800,000 barrels per day), amounting 
to a staggering $9 billion since January 2006. By the end of 2006, Minis-
ter for Petroleum Resources Edmund Daukoru claimed that the cost of 
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the insurgency was N7.5 billion per day,124 amounting to a total loss of 
$16 billion since 2005.125
The elections of April 2007 (even more fraudulent than the widely 
condemned elections of 2003) and the emergence of an Ijaw politician, 
Goodluck Jonathan, Governor of Bayelsa State, as the Vice President-
elect, has done little to dampen the ire of the militants. Since 1 May 
2007 (as of June 2007), forty-two foreign workers have been kidnapped 
and four pipelines have been blown up.126 In spite of the one month 
post-election truce called by MEND in early June, attacks and ransoms 
have continued almost unabated (there were seven between June 1 and 
June 23, 2007). As of August 2008, the violence is undiminished.
Ken Saro-Wiwa, the pipe-smoking writer equipped with the power 
of the pen, has now been replaced by the figure of the masked militant 
armed with the ubiquitous Kalashnikov, the “typewriter” of the illiter-
ate. But even Saro-Wiwa’s gravest fears could not have anticipated the 
calamitous descent into violence over the last decade, culminating in 
the dramatic appearance of MEND. Within a year of their appearance, 
MEND had, as they themselves predicted, shut-in over one-third of 
Nigeria’s oil output. Writing in mid-2007, the International Herald Tri-
bune captures vividly the brave new world ushered in by MEND:
Companies now confine employees to heavily fortified compounds, 
allowing them to travel only by armored car or helicopter… . One com-
pany has outfitted bathrooms with steel bolts to turn them into ‘panic’ 
rooms, if needed. Another has coated the pylons of a giant oil-production 
platform 130 kilometers, or 80 miles, offshore with waterproof grease to 
prevent attackers from climbing the rig… .  Some foreign operators have 
abandoned oil fields or left the country altogether. ‘I can’t think of any-
thing worse right now,’ said Larry Johnson, a former U.S. Army officer 
who was recently hired to toughen security at a Nigerian site operated 
by Eni, an Italian oil producer. ‘Even Angola during the civil war wasn’t 
as bad.’127
By November 2007, oil revenues were down by 40%, and 900,000 
bpd shut-in. Shell alone, the largest operator, accounting for almost 
half of all oil output, had lost $10.6 billion since late 2005. Ken Saro-
Wiwa’s desolate prediction in 1990 of a “coming war” had seemingly 
come to pass.
The Niger Delta’s long festering crisis is nourished by a gigantic 
reservoir of anger and dissent. The reality on the ground is a dizzy-
ing and bewildering array of militant groups, militias, and cults: the 
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Niger Delta Militant Force Squad, the Niger Delta Strike Force, the 
Grand Alliance, Niger Delta Coastal Guerillas, South-South Liberation 
Movement, Movement for the Sovereign State of the Niger Delta, the 
Meinbutus, the November 1895 Movement, ELIMOTU, the Arogbo 
Freedom Fighters, Iduwini Volunteer Force, the Niger Delta People’s 
Salvation Front, the Coalition for Militant Action, the Greenlanders, 
Deebam, Bush Boys, KKK, Black Braziers, Icelanders, and a raft of other 
so-called cults. Over fifty operating military camps are dotted around 
the creeks. A large survey of Niger Delta oil communities by Professor 
Aderoju Oyefusi, published in 2007, discovered that an astonishing 
36.23% revealed a “willingness or propensity to take up arms against 
the state.” The incontestable fact, as Ledum Mittee, the Ogoni human 
rights campaigner, has noted, is that there is overwhelming popular 
sympathy for what the militants are doing. Some sources estimate the 
number of trained militants now operating in the creeks at more than 
25,000, commanding monthly salaries of over N50,000 (well above the 
wage that might be secured by an educated youth employed in the 
formal sector). For their part, the oil companies have lost their license 
to operate.
How did it all come to this?
V. Niger Delta Rebellion: Oil Insurgency or Organized Crime?
There have been a raft of new books on African oil in the last year.128 
Written for the most part by journalists (and in one case by two mili-
tary men), the books are replete with colorful stories of the devastating 
intersection of frontier capitalism and the worst of African kleptocra-
cies, neatly captured by such titles as “instant emirates,” “the Chinese 
are coming,” and “wielding the oil weapon,” describing “some of the 
most dangerous and dysfunctional nations on the planet.” None of 
this work would have been possible without twenty years of criti-
cal academic research and excellent investigative work by the likes 
of Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Global Witness, and 
Oxfam. Whatever one thinks of the “resource curse” literature129 (and I 
think it comes close to a sort of commodity determinism), this body of 
work exposes the pathologies of petro-states, the complex complicities 
between Big Oil and African “oiligarchies,” and the disastrous conse-
quences—environmental, political, and economic—of rentier political 
economies driven by the logic of politicized distribution of oil rev-
enues rather than systematic accumulation, or disciplined develop-
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ment, or the construction of transparent and accountable institutions 
of governance. Over the decade, the resource curse, which for the most 
part examined the political economy of oil dependency, has been taken 
up by economists, some concerned with the relations between resource 
dependency and poor economic performance (for example, Jeffrey 
Sachs) and more recently with the politics of oil, not so much at the 
level of corruption or fiscal mismanagement but rather sub-national 
conflicts and the relations between oil, civil war, and rebellion. By 
far and away the most ambitious and sophisticated research program 
emerged from the World Bank and the leadership of Paul Collier, for-
mer member of International Socialist and the World Bank, now at 
Oxford. His 2007 book, The Bottom Billion, turns resource dependency 
into a field theory of poverty. Oil dependency, in this analysis, turns 
on the relation between petroleum (not so much natural gas) and the 
means by which rebellions and insurgencies are economically sus-
tained and financed—and, by extension, the devastating costs for 
development of long and protracted conflicts.130
This complex and variegated body of research131 might be dubbed 
the “predation or rebellion as organized crime” theory of oil depen-
dency. Collier’s clever theory focuses on the important question of 
financing violent politics. It argues that oil provides a ground on 
which rebels can finance rebellions (through looting the oil resources), 
which are self-interested, criminal movements against the state. Col-
lier’s “economics of war” argument (“rebellion is large scale predation 
of productive activities”) draws upon a related and now large body 
of work that explores the character of oil as a source of predation by 
focusing on its point (as opposed to diffuse) character, its location (in 
relation to state power), and the ease with which it can be looted. Dif-
ferent political outcomes can then be deduced from specific resource 
attributes:132 warlordism (distant/diffuse), rebellion (proximate/diffuse), 
coups (proximate/point), and secession (distant/point). Oil is captured 
in the latter two cases (it is a point resource that varies in relation to 
centers of power). Angola, Chechnya, Colombia, and Yemen are para-
digmatic cases.
In a similar vein, Michael Ross explores the dynamics of oil politics 
along two parallel axes: lootability (understood to be “easily appro-
priated [resource] by individuals or small groups of unskilled work-
ers”133) and “obstructability” (the ease with which its movement or its 
productive networks can be interrupted or blocked). Oil (on-shore and 
offshore) is not lootable; it is, however, readily obstructable (pipelines 
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can be detonated, flow stations occupied) on shore, but not offshore.134 
He holds open the possibility that oil (as an unlootable resource) may 
yield different types of outcomes (separatist in Cabinda, and non-sepa-
ratist in Sudan), but believes that unlootability yields general associa-
tions. In other words, unlootability is likely to yield separatism (control 
of the territory, not the wealth), benefits to government rather than the 
poor, the reduced duration of conflicts, and enhanced army discipline.
Much could be said about Collier’s work in particular: its deep cyni-
cism (“rebellion…is like organized crime”); its belief that motivations 
in a conflict are unimportant (what matters is whether the organiza-
tion can sustain itself financially); its assumption that history can be 
reduced to rates of economic growth or the existence of prior civil con-
flict; its troubling problems associated with the nature of the data, evi-
dence, and sampling; and its claim that insurgent predation is “worse” 
than state extortion (or exaction).135 I shall focus on its foundational 
claims and their capacity to provide a compelling account of the gen-
esis of an oil insurgency across the Niger Delta. Their basic premises 
are that greed is opposed to grievance, that peaceful protest stands in 
opposition to rebellion, that government opposes rebellion, and that 
rebellion equals organized crime. From these assumptions, Collier con-
cluded in 2003 that the Niger Delta resembles an “American gangland” 
involving a ferocious struggle over drugs. By 2007, he suggested it 
was a vast “protection racket” run by young, unemployed, and poorly 
educated criminals for whom life is cheap.136 At the same time, as Zinn 
has noted, Nigeria seems to represent a striking exception to Collier’s 
predictions.137 His model saw civil war as unlikely between 1965 and 
1969 (when the Biafran war erupted), while on the other hand, the pos-
sibility for civil war was high between 1985 and 1999 (when there was 
no such conflict).138 How, then, does the predation-lootability thesis 
hold up?
The first criticism is that the very idea of an impermeable mem-
brane separating or opposing two discrete entities—government and 
rebels—breaks down immediately. Corporate actors are not present 
in any serious conceptual way and the so-called militias, for example, 
got their start by financial and weapons support from politicians in 
the oil-producing states. The NDPVF was, as Oronto Douglas says, 
“the creation of the Nigerian State.”139 It is widely understood that 
former Federal Minister of Transportation Abiye Sekibo supported the 
Okrika Vigilante (established in 1998) and its successor organization, 
the NDV, led by Ateke.140 The decentralization of corruption, the rise 
Michael Watts
113
of powerful gubernatorial machine politicians, and the enhanced state-
level influxes of petrodollars since 2000 all signal how porous is the 
state/rebel divide. The NDV and the NDPVF members were deployed 
as political thugs to deliver votes and intimidate voters in the noto-
riously corrupt and violent 2003 elections (although there were, of 
course, militias and militant groups that pre-date 2003 and, indeed, 
1999). Furthermore, a number of the arms used by the militias have 
been acquired from the Nigerian military (directly in relationship to 
electoral political thuggery and indirectly from a notoriously corrupt 
and undisciplined army). Last but not least, the low-level oil theft 
that is controlled by the rebels as a way of financing their struggle is 
organized directly with the complicity of the security apparatuses, the 
Niger Delta special military task forces, and the coast guard.141 The 
Nigerian state, in its various institutional expressions, and the rebels 
are both oppositional and organically self-sustaining. The head of the 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Nuhu Ribadu, articu-
lated the issue with great precision: the state is “not even corruption. 
It is organized crime.”142 Ribadu’s views might confirm the criminal 
aspects of the insurgency but this criminality is at odds with Collier’s 
suggestion that predation operates outside of state criminality. If there 
is organized crime, it seems to operate across the entire panoply of 
institutions and organizations involved in the oil business.
In the same way, Collier’s (and Ross’s) claim that oil cannot be looted 
stands in sharp contrast to the existence of a vast oil theft industry. This 
is not the place to detail the dynamics of its structure (from low-level 
bunkering territories policed by differing sorts of political actors up to 
the syndicates, global in scope, that orchestrate a vast criminal indus-
try), but an estimated 10% of U.S. imports are stolen.143 The point is that 
oil is looted, and very effectively. At its peak in 2004–05, some 350,000 
barrels per day were stolen, perhaps inserting $4–5 billion per year 
into the financial system. While the criminal proceeds are unevenly 
distributed along the commodity-chain (the low-level operatives gain 
little in relation to the barge owners, shippers, military, and so on), the 
fact is that both rebels and the political-security classes benefit from 
it.144 There is no question that the oil bunkering trade embraces all 
manner of agents motivated by all manner of desires (greed, grievance, 
employment, excitement), but there is in principle no reason why orga-
nized crime (or extortion and sabotage, as the obstructability thesis 
claims) and grievance cannot co-exist perfectly well. Theft by defini-
tion is a crime, but not all crime can be read simply as self-interested 
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greed: “we are using our resources to fund this struggle,” as Asari 
puts it. Indeed, this is the hybrid nature of insurgent politics. Equally, 
even if the scale has waxed and waned, oil theft has a long history in 
the delta, dating back to the 1970s, even if it was only recognized as a 
serious problem in the late 1990s. In this sense, there has been no linear 
shift, as Collier suggests, from grievance to greed.145
Many of these delta realities represent an empirical challenge to 
conceptual claims about lootability. This structure of “predation” has 
benefited a section of the military-political class, sustained all manner 
of insurgents (and indirectly sections of the unemployed youth), fur-
ther contributed to corruption and indiscipline within the military, and 
contributed to a vast and complex field of violence. It encompasses, 
as well, organized insurgents confronting the state, ethnic militias, 
vigilante groups resembling the Mafia, anti-chieftainship conflicts, 
inter-ethnic struggles, and criminal activities sometimes called cultism. 
Needless to say, Ross’s very idea that offshore oil cannot be obstructed 
has been shown to be spectacularly wrong. In the last few weeks, hos-
tages were once again taken (and oil operations stopped) by MEND 
from a platform 30 miles offshore. In fact, MEND’s charismatic com-
munications chief, Jomo Gbomo, often refers to MEND’s abode as “200 
miles offshore.”
A most striking aspect of these views of oil politics and civil con-
flict is that the agency of the oil companies—whether the national 
oil companies or the supermajors with whom they operate or the oil 
service/construction companies—has no analytical presence whatso-
ever in the models of rebellion or civil war. At most they appear as the 
unfortunate corporate entities that are predated upon by rebels via 
extortion, sabotage, and kidnapping. Corporate practice and agency 
are conspicuously absent in any account of politics. This is astonishing 
because the companies themselves have acknowledged that they are 
a central part of the political dynamics of community conflict, most 
obviously in the internal reports by Shell and Chevron widely leaked 
in 2003 and 2004.146 This is not to suggest that corporations have delib-
erately instigated or encouraged rebellion. Rather, what passes as com-
munity development in the delta, and a company’s related interactions 
with what are called “host communities,” are a central part of conflict 
dynamics.147 It is estimated that Shell spends $60 million per year on 
community development, yet cash payments amount to at least double 
that figure. In total, these payments add up to perhaps $200 million per 
annum, possibly 10% of the operating budget; some companies spend 
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up to 15–17% on such activities.148 They represent a massive infusion 
of cash designed to purchase consent or compliance.
In practice, however, they are central to the dynamics of rebellion 
and community violence. One the one hand, companies are constitu-
tionally obliged to pay rents to the local communities in which they 
have operations. They have typically cut deals with local chiefs (many 
of whom operate unaccountable fiefdoms), a number of whom are 
not even resident in their communities. Community projects and 
Memoranda of Understanding, to the extent that they exist at all, are 
shrouded in secrecy and ambiguity. Corporate responsibility on the 
ground often appears as a raft of unfinished community projects, all 
of which have contributed to festering resentments among the youth. 
Environmental Impact Assessments are rarely made public and the 
record on spills and compensation is deplorable.
Last but not least, the policy of “cash payments”—used to pay for 
protection services from local unemployed youth, to buy off local 
opposition, and to feed a vast network of illicit payments—have had 
the effect of generating enormously violent conflicts among youth 
groups. Some of these payments are made to militias who have “secu-
rity companies” of their own.149 Young men who are given standby 
payments or hired as protection services inevitably engage in struggles 
among themselves to capture or preserve the rents from competitors 
(other youth groups). Or they threaten or depose corrupt local chiefs 
(that is to say, they upend the system of gerontocratic rule at the vil-
lage level) in order to gain access to the company rents and payments 
that flow from oil operations in their territories. Corporate practice 
and the struggle over oil rents to chiefs have contributed directly to 
the longstanding inheritance and dynastic politics in kingdoms such 
as Nembe, Bonny, Opobo, and Okrika, and more generally to what can 
only be described as a crisis of chiefly rule across the oil fields. The fact 
that so many chieftainships are ferociously contested and that, in some 
cases, chiefs are thrown from office or publicly flogged by militant and 
angry youth—surely unthinkable three decades ago—is a measure not 
simply of the governance crisis of customary rule, but of the endemic 
nature of the local conflicts and struggles that are key ingredients in 
the rise of the larger militias, such as the NDV or FNDIC.
The challenge of the Niger Delta case to the resource-dependency/
predation thesis is four-fold. First, in its relatively brief petro-his-
tory, Nigeria has exhibited all four of the possible political outcomes 
hypothesized by Le Billon and the predation thesis more generally: 
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a coup d’état (beginning in 1966), secession (the Biafran War), rebel-
lion (MEND), and warlordism (the militias). What do these multiple 
outcomes suggest about the validity of the theory regarding predation, 
location, and resource characteristics?
Second, the importance of commodity attributes, lootability most 
obviously, seems undercut by the extent to which the purportedly 
unlootable (oil as opposed to, say, diamonds) and the unobstructable 
(offshore platforms and rigs) are clearly looted and obstructed.
Third, how does the predation thesis deal with an insurgency that 
has been at least fifty years in the making? What must be explained 
is the co-evolution of ethno-national and intergenerational shifts in 
political power detonated by a recurrent history of state violence. It 
confounds the simplistic generalizations that governments and rebels 
and greed and grievance are easily separable. In practice, they are 
indissoluble.
Finally, organized crime, which is, as Collier asserts, central to the 
economics of insurrection, has an organizational structure and reach 
that far exceeds the circumference of the rebels themselves and must 
include, at the very least, state and corporate operatives. Embedded 
within this claim is the larger issue of the nature and consequences of 
corporate power for the predation thesis.
VI. Oil Rebels and the Bottom Billion
The insurgency across the Niger Delta, involving a welter of differing 
groups and interests, is inextricably wrapped up with the intersection 
of generational politics, a corrupt and violent petro-state, irresponsible 
and short-sighted oil company practices, and the existence of a vast oil 
bunkering network. As Kalyvas suggests, viewed from the micro-level 
these sorts of insurgencies resemble “welters of complex struggles” 
in which the notion that the rebels are criminals who operate against 
law-abiding states fails to capture the true dynamics at work.150 Group 
interests are often “localistic and region-specific,”151 yet, as I have tried 
to argue, their specificity emerges from the structured totality of the 
national and regional oil complex. It all makes for an enormously 
unstable and volatile mix of economic, political, and social forces, now 
located on a larger and more intimidating canvas of global oil instabil-
ity and the Global War on Terror.
To return to Collier’s book and its claims about civil war and 
resource traps, my purpose has not been to provide a full assessment 
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of the “resource curse.” Collier’s approach has been “Large N” (cross-
national) in orientation, rather than case study oriented, as my own 
is here. At the very least, one can say that this body of research has 
shown often contradictory results regarding the relations between 
resources, growth, and conflict.152 It appears that only oil (among the 
energy and non-energy resources) appears to offer a robust association 
with the onset and duration of conflicts. This raises the question of the 
specific qualities of oil (and gas?) that do not seem to hold for other 
resources. But is the oil case quite as clear cut?153 Differing measures of 
the resource itself—oil output versus oil reserves, or oil revenues as a 
share of GDP, or oil rents—disclose rather different and contradictory 
patterns and associations. Hence, De Soysa and Neumayer, by using 
a particular measure of oil rents, find that the oil-conflict relationship 
using the conventional measure of civil war (1,000 battle deaths) is 
not met.154 The relationship seems to hold only for “low intensity” 
(25 battle deaths) conflicts. Collier makes use of Oyefusi’s important 
survey of Niger Delta communities155 to bolster his case but there are 
all manner of inconsistencies here, too. Some of this turns on the data 
itself: the oil variable consists only of the number of wells within a 
community territory and nothing of their status (producing or non-
producing) or the quality and quantity of oil from local oil fields and 
wells. More fundamentally, Oyefusi’s data seems to indicate (contra 
Collier’s account of rebel recruitment and mobilization) that education, 
ethnicity, and assets increase the likelihood of personal grievance as 
a basis for rebel participation. Unemployment seems to be of no con-
sequence as regards grievance level or rebel participation. All of this 
makes for, as Michael Ross has admitted,156 a much more complex field 
of causality. Resource wealth and political violence may co-vary, but it 
may be that the obsession with resources mistakes a symptom, a state 
failure, for a cause.157
My concern here has been to explore some of the claims predicated 
on the analytical categories deployed in the name of the resources 
curse: the sharp distinctions between states and rebels; the distinc-
tion between greed and grievance; the purported significance of point 
versus non-point resources; and the lootability or nonlootability of 
resources as a prerequisite for financing rebellion. I have chosen not 
to question the existence of grievances as such, but to see under what 
circumstances these grievances are incorporated into a rebellion. Such 
conditions I interpret as an oil complex with its own characteristics 
(enclave, corporate, militarized) and dynamics (oil theft, state-rebel 
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collaboration). Here the Nigerian case, as singular as it is, highlights 
issues that are passed over in Collier and related work.
Key to understanding the disorder and violence within which 
opportunity structures are constituted are issues including the enclave 
character of the economy, in which extremes of poverty and wealth 
(and the environmental costs) are juxtaposed in close proximity; the 
strategic significance of the resources in which corporate, foreign, gov-
ernmental, and military powers form a center of economic and political 
calculation; and the fact of state capacity and, hence, the pre-exist-
ing (pre-oil) political dynamics into which oil is inserted (rather than 
“poor governance”). Not least, what is absolutely missing from these 
analyses is the role and function of the transnational oil companies 
themselves. In the literature, they only exist to the extent that they are 
predated upon and/or are the source for extorting rents. The Nigerian 
case shows otherwise. In this sense, the suspicion surrounding Big 
Oil—as true in the U.S. as it is in Nigeria—assumes an important role 
in the extent to which local grievances have “legs.” Corporate power 
(yes, constrained by the powers of nationalist states) and their policies 
of cash payments, community development, and unaccountable trans-
actions with government and local communities alike, must be central 
to any serious account of insurgency.
The picture that emerges from the Niger Delta is one in which the 
oil insurgency—itself a complex amalgam of Clapham’s liberation, 
separatist, reform, and warlord insurgencies158—is part of an economy 
of violence. It resembles forms of social and class struggle (some crimi-
nalized, some not) within a historically and politically specific form of 
primitive accumulation (or accumulation by dispossession as David 
Harvey describes it159). Rather than poverty, economic stagnation, and 
a lot of oil (Collier’s foundation stones), our starting point might be 
a historical sense of class and socio-political exclusion, corporate and 
other capital flows, and military neo-liberalism. To pose oil politics 
in this way is doubtless unfashionable. It represents a language that 
Collier by his own admission, on the first page of his book, ascribed to 
in 1968 and then abandoned as he moved to his perch at Harvard, the 
World Bank, and now Oxford. For all of its cleverness (and in my view, 
its extraordinary cynicism), I am not sure that The Bottom Billion might 
not have benefited from a dose of the revolutionary ardor that Paul Col-
lier apparently subscribed to in the days when one could claim to be of 
the Left without sounding silly or having to offer an apology. In any 
case, Nigeria’s oil insurgency points to the multidimensional character 
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of opportunity structures for mobilization from below. In this regard, 
Nigeria’s case resembles that of Colombia, brilliantly documented by 
Jenny Pearce, in which she concludes that while oil played a huge role 
in the escalation of armed conflict through “opportunities for preda-
tion,” it was “policy failure, collusion of civil actors and terror and fear 
in the absence of the rule of law that created the opportunity struc-
ture” for civil war and rebellion.160 These opportunities emerge from, 
and are the products of, what Christopher Cramer calls the “double 
helix of violent conflict,”161 one strand of which reflects the primitive 
accumulation of the developing world while the other is the dynamics 
and interests of the advanced capitalist states. This essay, elucidating 
the oil complex and within it the petro-state, is my attempt to lay out 
something of the structure of the political-economic DNA as it operates 
through a particular economy of violence in the Niger Delta. •
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